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REVISITING THE IMPACT OF THE CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1998 ON THE
BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLAYERS AND MANAGEMENT IN
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
Lacie L. Kaiser
INTRODUCTION
Since 1922, professional baseball, particularly Major League Baseball' ("MLB"), has
been placed on a pedestal courtesy of the United States Supreme Court.2 Professional baseball
has enjoyed immunity from federal antitrust law.3 This immunity has allowed MLB to place
restraints on the players' market without having to worry about liability for anticompetitive
restraints. However, in 1998 the United States Congress changed professional baseball's status
in federal antitrust law by enacting the Curt Flood Act of 1998.4 The Curt Flood Act
proscribed that professional baseball would no longer be exempt from antitrust law for issues
arising out of the relationship between the players and management. The Curt Flood Act had
the potential to change the dynamics of the bargaining relationship in Major League Baseball.
After passage of the Curt Flood Act, management could no longer rely on immunity from
federal antitrust law when unilaterally placing restrictions on the labor market.
Because of the interplay with federal antitrust law and federal labor law, this paper
J.D. candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2005; B.A. Sport Management & Communication, University
of Michigan, 2002.
1 Major League Baseball (MLB) is the top professional baseball league in the United States and Canada. MLB
consists thirty teams in two leagues, the National League started in 1876 and the American League started in 1901.
See Major League Baseball, History ofthe Game, at http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/history/index.jsp (last
visited Apr. 28, 2004).
2 See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat'l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
3 See id.
4 Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2004).
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seeks to explore how the bargaining relationship between Major League Baseball players and
the league was changed after the Curt Flood Act of 1998. Part II addresses the background
information needed to explore the bargaining relationship. It will provide an overview of
federal antitrust law, federal labor law, the interaction between federal antitrust law and federal
labor law, and professional baseball's judicially-created immunity from antitrust law. Part III
will analyze how the Curt Flood Act affected the bargaining relationship. The analysis will
explore whether the Curt Flood Act has legally affected the players' and the league's role in the
bargaining relationship, and whether the changing political and socio-economic climates since
1922 to the present has affected the bargaining relationship, in particular the culmination point
of the Curt Flood Act in 1998. This paper will conclude that the bargaining relationship
between players and management in Major League Baseball has not been effectively changed
by the language of Curt Flood Act of 1998 itself, but that socio-economic and political
concerns surrounding the Curt Flood Act are what impacted the bargaining relationship.
II. HISTORY/BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
In order to understand today's bargaining relationship between MLB players and the
league, it is important to explore the legal history of federal antitrust and labor law. The
interaction between these two areas of law is essential to understanding how the bargaining
relationship is affected by antitrust immunity. Against this backdrop, it will be possible to
explore how MLB's special immunity under federal antitrust law since 1922, and the Curt
Flood Act's termination of that immunity for player and management relations.
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A. Federal Antitrust Law
In 1890, the United States Congress passed the Sherman Act of 1980,5 the first in a line
of statutory antitrust regulations. Congress "wanted to go to the utmost extent of its
Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements . . ."6 and thus "mandat[ed]
for [the United States] a competitive business economy . . . ." Such an economic scheme
yields "the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and
the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to
the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions."8 The antitrust laws are not
meant to regulate the size, growth, or power of a particular business, but only to regulate
unreasonable anticompetitive methods that may be used to obtain or maintain market power. 9
Of all the federal antitrust legislation enacted,' 0 two particular provisions have impacted the
sports world the most."
First, Section 1 of the Sherman Act states, "Every contract, combination in the form of a
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
5 Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004). In passed the Sherman Act, Congress relied on its Constitutional
power to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
6 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194 (1974) (quoting United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944)).
Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 1973).
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
9 United States v. N.Y. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 642 (E.D. Ill. 1946), aff'd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th
Cir. 1949).
10 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-37 (2004) (includes the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914).
11 Id. §§ 1-2. The penalties for violating Section 1 or Section 2 can be severe. Violation of Section 1 or Section 2
is a felony punishable by fines up to $350,000 for a non-corporation entity and up to $10,000,000 for a
corporation, or by imprisonment for up to three years. Sherman Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2004). A private
person and the United States Government may sue for treble damages and a State Attorney General may bring a
civil action on behalf of a natural person for treble damages. Clayton Act of 1914 §§ 4, 4A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a,
15c (2004). Private persons can also seek injunctive relief. Id. § 26.
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with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal."12  Section 1 focuses on concerted
activity that unreasonably restrains interstate commerce. 3  Typical activities that raise
questions under Section 1 are price fixing, 14 division of markets and territorial restrictions, 5
exclusive dealing,' 6 and tying agreements. 17
There are two tools of analysis for Section 1 claims, but only one tool has been used in
sport-related cases.1 Due to the unique nature of the business of sports, courts have rejected
application of per se violations to the sports world and have consistently applied the "rule of
reason." 19 To understand the "rule of reason," the theory behind per se violations must be
explored. A per se violation is a business "practice [that] facially appears to be one that would
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output." 20  In other words,
12 15 U.S.C. § 1.
13 See Aspen Title & Escrow, Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1477, 1484 (D. Or. 1987) ("[t]he essence of a
Section 1 action is concerted rather than unilateral action"); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467
U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (needing a "plurality of actors ... for a § I conspiracy"); Six Twenty-Nine Prods., Inc. v.
Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478, 484 (5th Cir. 1966) ("[i]t is fundamental that at least two independent
business entities are required for violation of Section 1, while one alone is sufficient under Section 2").
14 Price fixing involves any restraint of trade that tends to set a price or maintain a price. United States v.
Frankfort Distilleries, Inc. 324 U.S. 293 (1945). Price fixing is still illegal even if the seller is the injured party
rather than the consumer or purchaser. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235
(1948).
15 Division of markets and territorial restrictions are horizontal restraints in which competitors minimize
competition by allocating territories at the same market level. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. 405 U.S.
596, 608 (1972).
16 Exclusive dealing when occurs a party refuses to sell his product except to those who purchase from him
exclusively. Dueber Watch-Case Mfg. Co. v. E. Howard Watch & Clock Co., 66 F. 637, 645 (2d Cir. 1895). On
its own, exclusive dealing is legal. Kingray, Inc. v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1197 (S.D. Cal.
2002). The exclusive contract must intend to or actually harm competition of the relevant market. Id.
17 Tying agreements occurs when one party conditions the sale of his product upon the purchase of another
product. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
18 See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
19 'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103-04. The Supreme Court did not apply a per se
analysis to college football. If not, sport leagues would always be in violation of antitrust by the per se violation of
horizontal restraints on competition. Id. at 100-01. For a criticism of the "rule of reason" test see Regents of Univ.
of California v. Am. Broadcasting Company, 747 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1984) (commenting on the use of the "rule of
reason" in price-fixing and group boycotts charges and suggested that the sper se analysis would be better).
20 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
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some restraints are "presumed to have no benefit to competition in the industry [market]." 21
In contrast, the "rule of reason" gives sport leagues the chance to balance
22
anticompetitive injuries with procompetitive benefits. Courts give leagues the opportunity to
provide business justifications for what on the surface might appear to be an unreasonable
restraint of trade.23 Under such a test, it must be shown that there exists "(1) an agreement or
conspiring among two or more persons ... ; (2) by which the persons ... intend to harm or
restrain competition; and (3) which actually injures competition." 24 Although sport leagues
enjoy some judicial nicety by having the "rule of reason" applied, they are still often found to
be in violation of Section 125 because application of either per se rules or the "rule of reason"
"does not change the ultimate focus of [the] inquiry" 26 which measures the "competitive
significance of the restraint."27
Second, Section 2 of the Sherman Act focuses on monopolies and their power to impact
interstate trade.28 Section 2 states, "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
21 Lisa Pike Masteralexis, Antitrust and Labor Law: Professional Sport Application, in LAW FOR RECREATION AND
SPORT MANAGERS, 664 (Doyice J. Cotton et al., eds., 2d ed. 2001). The per se test is generally applied in only
two situations: 1) the courts seek to avoid a long inquiry into an industry's business operations, and 2) the courts
examine "agreements between traditional business competitors." Id.
22 Nat'I Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 103-04.
23 Id. at 104.
24 Oltz v. St. Peter's Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1988).
25 See e.g. United States Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335 (2nd Cir. 1988); Law v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998); Chicago Prof I Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball
Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992).
26 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Association v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103.
27 Id. (quoting Nat'l Soc. of Prof I Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
28 See Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
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guilty . ... 29 The purpose of the monopoly provision is not to prohibit anyone from having
monopoly power, but is to prohibit a person from attempting to gain or maintain monopoly
power in any part of commerce from the use of illegal trade practices. 30 "Hence the existence
of power 'to exclude competition when it is desired to do so' is itself a violation of [Section 2],
provided it is coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that power." 31
In order to prove a violation of Section 2, two elements must be shown. First, the
person must have monopoly power in the product and geographic markets. 32 Second, the
person misused that power by either acquiring the monopoly by illegal means or by
maintaining the monopoly by illegal means.33 Monopolies gained or maintained "from growth
or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident"
are not illegal.34
Although Section 1 and Section 2 may overlap in terms of the objectives of the person
involved in antitrust activity, violations of Section 1 and Section 2 are legally distinct
offenses. In other words, the provisions can be violated independently of each other.36
29 Id. For purposes of federal antitrust legislation, "person" is defined "to include corporations and associations
existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of
any State, or the laws of any foreign country." Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (2004).
30 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1948).
31 Id. at 107 (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946)).
32 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United States Football League v. Nat'l Football
League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1358 (2d Cir. 1988).
33 [d.
34 Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571.
3 Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 788 (1946). Section 2 was intended to supplement Section 1.
Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 60 ("the second section serves to establish that it was intended to supplement the
first and to make sure that by no possible guise could the public policy embodied in the first section be frustrated
or evaded").
36 Id. ; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 (1940). It is not a violation of the Fifth
Amendment's double jeopardy to be convicted under both Section 1 and Section 2 for the same activity. See Am.
Tobacco Co., 328 U.S. at 787-788.
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Monopoly power is a "species of restraint of trade;" 37 therefore, the "same kind of predatory
practices may show violations of [both]."38 One of the main differences between Section 1 and
Section 2 violations is the requirement of two or more actors for a Section 1 violation, but this
is not required for a Section 2 violation.39
B. Federal Labor Law
In 1935, the United States Congress passed the Wagner Act to govern the relationship
between unions, employers, and workers. 40 The goal of the Wagner Act was to ensure workers
the rights to unionize and bargain collectively. 4 1 The Wagner Act and subsequent amendments,
such as the Taft-Hartley amendments and the Landrum-Griffin amendments, are collectively
known as the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").42
The heart of the NLRA is Section 7.43 Section 7 guarantees,
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
"44
organization as a condition of employment....
Section 7 rights of union organization, collective bargaining, and concerted activity are
37 White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1942) (quoting United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940)).
38 Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 463 (1960).
39 Six Twenty-Nine Prods., Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478, 484 (5th Cir. 1966); Moore v. Jas. H.
Matthews & Co., 473 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1972).
40 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1994).
41 See § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
42 See id §§ 151 et seq. The Taft-Hartley amendments were enacted in 1947 and added union unfair labor
practices. Id. The Landrum-Griffin amendments were enacted in 1959, and they regulate the internal affairs of
unions. Id
43 See id § 157.
44
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protected and enforced through various employer and union unfair labor practices. 45
The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), the governing agency of federal labor
law, was also created by the Wagner Act.46 The NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over labor
disputes, unfair labor practices, and bargaining representation issues. 4 7 However, for
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the NLRB's jurisdiction is limited. The
NLRB will not interpret collective bargaining agreements in order to solve disputes arising
under the agreement.48 If there is a grievance process and arbitration clause, the NLRB will
only construe the collective bargaining agreement to determine unfair labor practices.49
However, if the underlying contractual dispute is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice,
and there has been an arbitration decision on the matter, the NLRB will defer to that decision.50
The NLRB will also postpone deciding an unfair labor practice if arbitration under the
collective bargaining agreement is pending.5'
State and federal courts can also become involved in the interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements. 52 If there is no binding arbitration clause in the collective bargaining
agreement, the court may look at the merits of the case and determine whether there was a
45 Unfair labor practices for both employers and union are found in Section 8 of the National Relations Act. Id. §
158.
46 Id. § 153.
47 See id § § 159-60.
48 The National Labor Relations Act contains no provision granting the National Labor Relations Board the power
to interpret and enforce collective bargaining agreements. See id §§ 151 et seq.
49 NLRB v. C.C. Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
50 Olin Corp., 286 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
i United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
52 See Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994) (Section 301 provides, "Suits for violations
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees ... or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."). State courts also have
jurisdiction to hear breach of contract claims under Section 301. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S.
502 (1962). State courts still must apply the federal common law of labor law. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucus
Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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breach of contract.53 If there is a binding arbitration clause, then the court will not look at the
merits of the underlying dispute.54 Instead, the courts will enforce the bargain the union and
the employer made by ordering arbitration.5 5 Most disputes over interpreting collective
bargaining agreement are settled through the grievance process set forth in the contract.56 And
like the NLRB, the courts also give great deference to arbitration decisions.
It should be noted that the NLRB did not recognize jurisdiction over professional sports
when the Wagner Act established the NLRB in 1935.5' The NRLB first recognized that the
NLRA governs professional sport leagues and their players in 1969.59 The players have the
right to unionize and bargaining collectively under the protection of federal labor law and
Section 7 of the NLRA.
C. The Interplay Between Antitrust and Labor Law
Soon after the Sherman Act of 1890 was enacted, federal antitrust and labor law clashed
in the courts. State and federal courts became involved in labor disputes when employers
sought to enjoin union activity as a "contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . ." under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 6 0 Of
53 Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168 (1990).
54 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
5 Id. (assuming the parties did not follow the grievance process outlined in the governing collective bargaining
agreement). Unions are generally not bound in the collective bargaining agreement to take every grievance to
arbitration, unless they agree to do such. In deciding not to take a grievance to arbitration, the union cannot act
arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith. See Air Line Pilot Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991).
1 Ninety-six percent of collective bargaining agreements have some form of binding grievance arbitration.
Stephan F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment,
43 B.C. L. Rev. 351, 359 n.55 (2002).
For an example of case where an arbitration decision is challenged because the arbitrator refused to admit
relevant evidence, but the court still upheld the arbitrator's decision see Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v.
Garvey, 532 U.S. 1015 (2001).
58 National Labor Relations Act, § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1994).
59 C. Peter Goplerud Ill, Collective Bargaining in the National Football League: A Historical and Comparative
Analysis, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 13 (1997).
6 Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
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the first ten cases brought under the Sherman Act, five involved unions.61 Four of the unions
were found to be in violation of federal antitrust laws.62
Following the use of the Sherman Act against organized labor by the courts, the United
States Congress enacted the Clayton Act of 1914, which contained two provisions pertaining to
labor unions.63 Section 6 states, "That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
or commerce."64 Section 6 made it clear that, "Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor ... organizations . ... 65 Section 20
states, "That no . . . injunction shall be granted by any court . . . in any case between an
employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or
between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a
dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment .... 66
However, the United States Supreme Court took a narrow reading of the provisions in
the Clayton Act by limiting the anti-injunction statutory provisions.67 "It would do violence to
the guarded language employed were the exemption extended beyond the parties affected in a
proximate and substantial, not merely a sentimental or sympathetic, sense by the cause of
dispute."68 Again, the Congress responded to the Court's holding by passing more legislation.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 broadens the anti-injunction language.69 It states, "No court
61 Highlights from the Rise ofAmerican Labor Unions, available at
http://www.felahfd.com/HFD5/ST75b-newsletter.htm#1 1 (last visited May 1, 2004). Of the other five cases first
brought under Section 1, only one case resulted in finding an antitrust violation against the defendant. Id.
62 [d
63 Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et. seq. (2004).64 Id. § 17.
65 id.
66 Clayton Act of 1914, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1994).
Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).61Id. at 472.
69 Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 (1994).
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... shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
in a case involving or growing out a labor dispute."7 o
Along with anti-injunction statutory provisions, federal antitrust and labor law also
interact when provisions in the collective bargaining agreement are involved. The implicit,
"nonstatutory labor exemption" is needed in order to make the collective-bargaining process
work.7 1  The nonstatutory labor exemption allows terms agreed upon in the collective
bargaining agreements to be exempt from federal antitrust law no matter how uncompetitive
the terms are.72 However, immunity will only apply the collective bargaining agreement's
provisions that are mandatory subjects of bargaining, the product of bona fide arm's length
bargaining, and part of the employee/employer relationship.73 Mandatory subjects of
bargaining arise out of "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."74
"Other terms and conditions of employment" are those "plainly germane to the 'working
environment"'7 5 and not among the managerial decisions that are at the "core of entrepreneurial
control."76
D. Major League Baseball and Antitrust
70 Id. One exception has been established by the Supreme Court from Norris-LaGuardia's proscription against
injunctions in labor disputes. See Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). If
the collective bargaining agreement has a binding arbitration clause and the merits of the underlying labor dispute
can be resolved in arbitration, then an injunction may be issued. Id. at 237-38.
7 See Connell Const. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
72 Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); United Mine Workers
of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
73 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
74 National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342, 348 (1985).
7 Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 498 (1979).
Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180, 182 (1989).
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Since 1922, professional baseball has enjoyed a special status created by the courts.
In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League, the Supreme Court gave baseball
complete immunity from federal antitrust laws, including Section 1 and Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.7 9 Relying on the need for interstate commerce in order for federal antitrust law
to be operative and categorizing the sport of baseball as an exhibition rather than commerce,
the Court reasoned,
The business is giving exhibitions of base ball [sic], which are purely state
affairs. It is true that in order to attain for these exhibitions the great popularity
that they have achieved, competitions must be arranged between clubs from
different cities and States. But the fact that in order to give the exhibitions the
Leagues must induce free persons to cross state lines and must arrange and pay
for their doing so is not enough to change the character of the business.8 0
These words bound all federal courts to give professional baseball complete immunity from the
Sherman Act and all subsequent antitrust acts until 1998, when Congress passed the Curt Flood
Act. The immunity greatly affected the bargaining relationship between players and
management because, unlike the other professional sport leagues, the players could not
challenge any restrictions unilaterally placed upon them by management as a federal antitrust
violation. The Supreme Court in 1957 made it clear that other professional sports would not
enjoy such immunity by unequivocally stating, "[W]e now specifically limit the rule there
established to the facts there involved, i.e., the business of organized professional baseball."82
7 See Roger I. Abrams, The Curt FloodAct: Before The Flood: The History OfBaseball's Antitrust Exemption, 9
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 307 (1999).
78 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
79 d.
80 Id.at 208-09.
8 See generally Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (stating that professional football was not
exempt from federal antitrust law); Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) (stating
professional basketball "does not enjoy exemption from the antitrust laws").
82 Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957).
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And in 1972, the Court again acknowledged that "other professional sports operating
interstate-football, boxing, basketball, and, presumably, hockey and golf-are not so
exempt."83
Although it was not until 1998 that baseball's immunity was narrowed, the scope of the
exemption was challenged on several occasions between 1922 and 1998.84 In the 1972 case of
Flood v. Kuhn,85 a player challenged MLB's reserve system that had been in place since
1887.86 Flood was traded from the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies without his
knowledge or consent.87  After learning about the trade, Flood petitioned MLB's
Commissioner88 to become a free agent, and was denied his request.89 Although the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged this illogical immunity, it refused to overrule the
exemption and stated that it is up to Congress to fix the inconsistency. 90 In reaffirming the
immunity for professional baseball, the Court noted four reasons for keeping the immunity in
place:
(a) Congressional awareness for three decades of the Court's ruling in Federal
Baseball, coupled with congressional inaction. (b) The fact that baseball was left
alone to develop for that period upon the understanding that the reserve system
was not subject to existing federal antitrust laws. (c) A reluctance to overrule
Federal Baseball with consequent retroactive effect. (d) A professed desire that
any needed remedy be provided by legislation rather than by court decree. 91
83 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-83 (1972).
84 See e.g. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (challenge to MLB's rejection of
the proposed move of the San Francisco Giants to Tampa, Florida).
407 U.S. 258 (1972).
8 Ild at 260.
8 Id. at 264-65.
88 Bowie Kent Kuhn served as MLB's Commissioner from 1969-1984. For information about Kuhn see Major
League Baseball, History of the Game, available at
http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/history/mlb history people.jsp (last visited May 1, 2004).
89 Flood, 407 U.S. at 264-65.
90 Id. at 279.
9' Id. at 273-274.
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Overall, the Court noted that the immunity for baseball was an established aberration
acquiesced to by the United States Congress and that stare decisis required the immunity to be
upheld.92
In 1998, Congress finally confronted and removed baseball's antitrust exemption for
issues between players and management. 93  After seventy-six years of ignoring Federal
Baseball Club ofBaltimore, Congress finally stated,
[T]he conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of
organized professional major league baseball directly relating to or affecting
employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the same extent such conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in
by persons in any other professional sports business affecting interstate
94commerce.
Professional baseball's antitrust immunity is still in place, but narrowed by the Curt Flood
Act.95 Under the Curt Flood Act, MLB players could potentially challenge the league's actions
pertaining to unilaterally placed restrictions on the labor market.
III. ANALYSIS
Although the Curt Flood Act of 1998 had the potential to change the bargaining
relationship between the players and management in MLB, its enactment came too late. This
92 Id. at 279.
93 Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2004). See Joshua P. Jones, A Congressional Swing AndMiss: The
Curt FloodAct, Player Control, And The National Pastime, 33 GA. L. REv. 639 (1999); J. Philip Calabrese,
Recent Legislation: Antitrust And Baseball, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 531 (1999).
94 15 U.S.C. § 12b (2004).
9 For more information on how the Curt Flood Act does not impact other areas of professional baseball see
generally Jennifer Dyer, The Curt Flood Act Of 1998: After 76 Years, Congress Lifts Baseball's Antitrust
Exemption On Labor Relations But Leaves Franchise Relocation Up To The Courts, 3 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. &
CLINICAL L. 247 (2000); Joshua P. Jones, A Congressional Swing and Miss: The Curt Flood Act, Player Control,
and the National Pastime, 33 GA. L. REV. 639 (1999).
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part will analyze how, if at all, the Curt Flood Act affects the bargaining relationship. Section
A will explore the legal climate of federal antitrust and labor law after the Curt Flood Act.
Section B will examine the shifting political and socio-economic climates surrounding the Curt
Flood Act and whether changes since 1922 affect the bargaining relationship in MLB today.
Section C will consider how ethical considerations for both players and management might
impact the bargaining relationship after the enactment of the Curt Flood Act. This paper
concludes by arguing that although legally the Curt Flood Act of 1998 may have slightly
affected the bargaining relationship between the league and the players, the change in the
socio-economic and political climates, and the ethical considerations exerts a greater influence
on the relationship.
A. The Changing Legal Climate
The legal climate has certainly changed since the enactment of the Sherman Act in
1890, the Wagner Act in 1935, and the Supreme Court's 1922 decision in Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore. These legal changes affect the way the Curt Flood Act of 1998 can be
applied and the practical considerations surrounding the bargaining relationship between the
players and the management. This section will first explore the role of concerted activity
permitted by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). Before the Curt Flood
Act, Section 7 was the only tool that could be utilized by the players to force management into
making concessions at the bargaining table. The addition of federal antitrust law as a tool for
the players after the Curt Flood Act will also be examined. This section will also analyze
whether the Curt Flood Act was enacted too late to affect the legal climate of federal labor law
and the bargaining relationship between players and the league. Because of the nonstatutory
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labor exemption, restrictions on the player market, most of which have been in place for several
years, could possibly be placed in the collective bargaining agreement either though
incorporation of league rules or actual bargaining. Also, whether a federal antitrust suit could
actually be brought by the union, and to what length the players would be willing to go to in
order to be able to bring such an antitrust suit will be analyzed. All of these legal
considerations affect how the Curt Flood Act impacts the bargaining relationship, and whether
that impact made any practical difference at the bargaining table.
1. Antitrust Lawsuit as a Bargaining Toolfor the Players
Before the Curt Flood Act of 1998, concerted activity was the only weapon that the
union and the players had to force the hand of MLB management's hand into concessions at the
bargaining table. Unlike the unions in the other professional sport leagues, which could file
federal antitrust lawsuits against unilaterally imposed restrictions on the player market,
professional baseball players could not gain antitrust verdicts in their favor and return to the
bargaining table with the judicial victory as a starting point for negotiations. 96 Curt Flood and
other players like him found out the hard way after lengthy litigation. Even though the courts
agree that the exemption was contradictory and nonsensical, they refused to solve the problem
and adhered to federal antitrust immunity.97  No matter how anti-competitive a league's
restriction was on players, such as the reserve clause in Flood, the courts would do nothing
about it. The courts would merely cite stare decisis and instruct the players to lobby the United
96 The National Football League, the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey League have all
been found to violate antitrust laws for restraints they unilaterally imposed on their respective player markets. See,
e.g., Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971); Linesman v. World Hockey Ass'n,
439 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
97 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Piazza v. Major
League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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States Congress for a remedy. 98
The Curt Flood Act changed the players' bargaining power by adding another potential
tool to their arsenal. 99 The players can now seek help from the courts if the league unilaterally
imposes restrictions on the player market. Those restrictions will be analyzed under the "rule
of reason," and can be found to have an anticompetitive effect on the labor market. 100
The Curt Flood Act encourages cooperation between players and the league because
unilaterally imposed restrictions can be found to be violations of antitrust laws. The players are
no longer faced with a league that does not have to answer for unilaterally imposed
anticompetitive rules. The players do not have to call a strike to force management's hand at
the bargaining table because management needs the union's agreement in order to place
restrictions on the player market. MLB now lacks protection like other professional sport
leagues, which have had the federal antitrust laws used against them to force them into
concessions during bargaining.' 0 1
The nonstatutory labor exemption makes collective bargaining an essential tool for
restrictions on labor markets.' 02  Since MLB can no longer rely on its antitrust immunity
granted by the Supreme Court in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, the players' union now
has to agree to place restrictions on the player market into the collective bargaining
agreement's terms and conditions. 03 Even if the restrictions are placed in the agreement, they
98 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 279 (1972).
99 See Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2004).
100 See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
101 Supra text accompanying note 96.
102 See Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
103 See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat'l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965).
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still must be found to be a product of bona fide arm's length bargaining, to be mandatory
subjects of bargaining, and to primarily affect the parties in the collective bargaining
agreement.104 Bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act is based on the concept of
good faith and the mentality of quid pro quo.0 5 Recently, the nonstatutory labor exemption in
the context of professional sport leagues was examined. A college football player challenged
the National Football's ("NFL") eligibility requirements for entry into the rookie draft. 106 The
NFL's rules regarding the eligibility requirements for the entry draft were merely incorporated
by reference to the league rules.1 07 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found that an incorporation clause of all the league rules and a waiver of the right to challenge
such rules were protected by the nonstatutory labor exemption. 08 The court found that there
had been arm's length bargaining over the incorporation clause and that the eligibility
requirements were a mandatory subject of bargaining.109 Since MLB is similarly situated to
the NFL for management and labor issues, the MLB can only place restrictions on the player
market, whether explicitly in the collective bargaining agreement or incorporated by reference,
if those terms meet the requirements for the nonstatutory labor exemption. Thus, the players'
union can take a more active role in what restrictions are placed on the labor market if they
chose to do so.
104 Mackey v. Nat'1 Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
05 See National Labor Relations Act, § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). "[T]o bargain collectively is the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession . . ." Id.
106 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
107 Id. at 127.
0 8 Id. at 139-43.
109 Id. at
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Overall, the Curt Flood Act of 1998 has given the players another "weapon," besides
the concerted activity of striking, to use against the league. In effect, it has potentially
strengthened the union and weakened the league by making the league rely on the players in
order to place restrictions on the players' market. Despite the apparent rejuvenation of player's
union under the Curt Flood Act, other legal and practical considerations may make the exercise
of bargaining power provided by the Curt Flood Act impractical.
2. Practical Impact of the Curt Flood Act on the Antitrust Lawsuit as a Bargaining Tool
Although the league can no long unilaterally impose restrictions on the player market
without fear of an antitrust lawsuit, the Curt Flood Act of 1998 came too late to actually help
the players gain more bargaining power. First, although management might have to rely on the
union to acquiescence in order to place restrictions on the player market (assuming they are
mandatory subjects of bargaining and part of bona fide arm's length bargaining) the same long-
standing restrictions the league has had in place can simply be placed explicitly or by reference
in the text of the collective bargaining agreement.1 10 The nonstatutory labor exemption offers
the league a safe haven for the same restrictive rules it placed on the players years before.
Although under the National Labor Relations Act, "good faith" bargaining is required, neither
party ever has to concede to the other side."' Management can insist on player restrictions in
place before the enactment of the Curt Flood Act without ever conceding to the players'
demands.
Second, MLB players now face the same problems as other professional sport leagues
when trying to bring an antitrust suit against management. As part of the nonstatutory labor
"0 Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
National Labor Relations Act, § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
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exemption, after a collective bargaining agreement is in place, an antitrust suit cannot be
brought against the league for restrictions on the player market contained within the collective
bargaining agreement.112 To make matters worse is that the ban on antitrust lawsuits extends
beyond the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. Under Powell v. National Football
League,113 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the nonstatutory
labor exemption applied to the collective bargaining agreement's terms after the agreement had
expired.1 14 Therefore, the restrictions in the collective bargaining agreement survive the
agreement's life in terms of the availability of an antitrust lawsuit.'5 Furthermore, the Eighth
Circuit found that the management of the NFL was protected from antitrust suits even after the
union and the league had reached a legal impasse in bargaining.116 Moreover, under National
Labor Relations Board v. Katz,117 management can make unilateral changes after an impasse is
reached.118  The Eighth Circuit conceded that a league may only implement changes
unilaterally if those terms were "reasonably contemplated during the bargaining process."119
The Eight Circuit's holding that impasse does not end the exemption, later endorsed by the
United States Supreme Court, would seriously restrict the availability of an antitrust lawsuit as
a bargaining tool.120 Simply stated, as long as restrictions on the players market are placed
explicitly or by reference in the collective bargaining agreement, the Curt Flood Act is
practically useless.
112 id.
113 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
1 14 Id. at 1302.
115 Id. at 1301.
1 16 Id. at 1303-04.
117 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
118 Id.
119 Goplerud, supra note 59; Powell, 930 F.2d at 1293.
120 See Brown v Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 231-32 (1996).
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However, there is one way that the baseball players could avoid the ban on antitrust
lawsuits even after impasse, but the solution is not practical. In response to Powell, the
National Football League Players' Association took the advice of the dissent in Powell and
ended their bargaining relationship with the league. 12 1 The players decided to decertify their
union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the NFL players, in order to pursue an
antitrust suit against the league. 122 The decision to decertify was drastic and not a practical
solution to dealing with an ongoing bargaining relationship.
At first glance the Curt Flood Act of 1998 does allow the players to bring suit for
anticompetitive restraints on the players market, and does grant the players the use of an
antitrust suit as a tool gain leverage at the bargaining table. However, through the nonstatutory
labor exemption, MLB is still heavily protected against antitrust suits. Therefore, the Curt
Flood Act's elimination of MLB's antitrust immunity in labor situations hardly, if at all,
changes the bargaining relationship or affects the strength of the players' union. However, the
changing socio-economic and political climate that caused the United States Congress to finally
address baseball's antitrust immunity may have a greater impact on the bargaining relationship.
B. The Changing Socio-Economic and Political Climates
The enactment of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 was the result of a long movement
towards trying to extinguish baseball's federal antitrust immunity. A number of socio-
economic and political aspects shifted to allow room for the Curt Flood Act to be enacted by
the United States Congress. The Supreme Court's view of interstate commerce and federal
labor law changed since 1922 and Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore. Although the Court
121 Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, dissenting).
122 Goplerud, supra note 59; See National Labor Relations Act, § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1994).
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chose not to overturn its 1922 decision, its urging of the use of the political process to change
the antitrust immunity and the viewing of baseball as a business rather than entertainment
might impact the current bargaining relationship.12 3
No longer do courts have the easy answer of "complete immunity" when faced with an
antitrust suit against MLB. Along with the changing view of the courts, the United States
Congress's ability to finally step up to the plate and take away baseball's privileged existence
impacts the bargaining relationship between players and management.124 The players can now
enter into the bargaining process with a federal statute addressing their relationship with the
league. Congress's change in position was greatly influenced by the public's view of the game
of baseball. The public's view was fueled by the labor turmoil prevalent in MLB, especially
the 1994-95 strike by MLB players.12 5 Following the 1994-95 strike, professional baseball had
to deal with backlash from the general public and lifetime fans of the game. All of these
factors affect the bargaining relationship for both the players and the league and will be
explored more fully in the following section.
1. The Court's View-1922 v. Today
In order to understand the bargaining relationship between players and management, the
judicial branch's view of professional baseball and its antitrust status must be explored. In
particular, the United States Supreme Court's view of baseball over the years is important to
understand why the bargaining relationship in baseball is changed after the Curt Flood Act of
1998. After its 1922 decision, the Court's attitude towards professional baseball changed, and
123 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 279 (1972).
124 Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2004).
125 Curt Flood Act of 1997, S. 118, 105th Cong. § 1 (1997).
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this in turn led the Court to urge the United States Congress to change the law.126 In addition,
the Court's changing view of labor law since establishing professional baseball's antitrust
immunity must be considered.
The Supreme Court's changing view of interstate commerce as applied to professional
baseball has changed since 1922. In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, the court viewed
baseball as entertainment, not business.127 The Court reasoned that traveling across state lines
to play the "exhibition of baseball" did not impact interstate commerce. 128 In 1922, the Court
understood baseball to only affect "state affairs."12 9 The Court saw baseball merely as an
ancillary activity to the national economy, failing to acknowledge its potential to become a
multi-billion dollar industry. 130
By the time Curt Flood challenged the reserve system in 1972, the Court's view of
baseball as entertainment bearing only slightly on interstate commerce changed drastically. In
Flood, the Court made its feeling about baseball clear. "It seems appropriate now to say that. .
. professional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce."' Also, the
Court recognized the movement towards globalization of baseball and viewed it as a business
that was involved not only in interstate commerce but global commerce as well.132
In its analysis of baseball's unique antitrust situation, the Court compared baseball to
126 Flood, 407 U.S. at 279.
127 Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat'l League, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922).
128 id.
129 id.
"0 E.g,, Major League Baseball is able to command billions of dollars for just its national broadcasting rights. It
has a $851 million five-year deal with Entertainment Sports and Programming Network (ESPN) and a $2.5 billion
five-year contract with Fox Broadcasting Company. Recent Television Rights Deals, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS
BUSINESS JOURNAL: BY THE NUMBERS 2004, Dec. 29, 2003, at 84. Major League Baseball's (MLB) deal with
ESPN runs from 2000 to 2005 and has an average annual value of $141.8 million for the league. Id MLB's deal
with Fox runs from 2001 to 2006 and has an average annual value of $416.7 million for the league. Id.
131 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
132 Id. at 279.
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the other professional sport leagues and could see no reason why professional baseball should
enjoy a special status while all of the other professional sport leagues were dealing with
antitrust lawsuits. 33
With its reserve system enjoying exemption from the federal antitrust laws,
baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly. Federal
Baseball [Club of Baltimore] and Toolson have become an aberration confined
to baseball . . . . Even though others might regard this as 'unrealistic,
inconsistent, or illogical,' the aberration is an established one. (citation
omitted) 34
Although the Court refused to overrule Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore in Flood,
the Court urged the United States Congress to correct its 1922 folly and banish professional
baseball from its comfortable existence.' 35  The Court did not want to interfere with stare
decisis itself. "It is an aberration that has been with us now for half a century, one heretofore
deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one that has survived the Court's
expanding concept of interstate commerce." 136 "And that issue is for Congress to resolve, not
this Court."' 37
It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court chose to ignore its own general rule of
statutory interpretation and construction. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that
exemptions from federal antitrust law should be narrowly construed.' 38 Yet, in cases following
and examining the 1922 case of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, the Court did not mention
their own rule regarding federal antitrust law and immunity for it. The Court could have held
133 See, e.g., Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (stating that professional football was not
exempt from federal antitrust law); Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) (stating
professional basketball "does not enjoy exemption from the antitrust laws").
134 Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
135 Radovich, 352 U.S. at 258.
13 Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
13 Id. at 277 (quoting United States v. Int'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 243 (1955)).
138 See, e.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1991).
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that professional baseball's antitrust immunity was limited to the facts in the 1922 case, but it
did not. Rather, the Court chose to keep a blanket exemption in place.139
Along with the Court's view of baseball's antitrust exemption, its view about federal
labor law and unionized labor in general changed as well. When the Sherman Act was passed
in 1890, the Court's view of unions was not favorable.140 With some prodding from Congress
with the passage of the Clayton Act of 1914, the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, and the
Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act) in 1935, the Court became more labor friendly.
Today, however, the trend has reversed. The nonstatutory labor exemption is a good example
of how the courts are more favorable to management. Anticompetitive provisions in the
collective bargaining agreement are exempt from antitrust.141 The courts' pro-management
view of labor law makes it impossible for players to challenge anticompetitive restrictions
unless they end their bargaining relationship with the league altogether. 142
The courts' views of antitrust immunity for baseball and the pro-management view of
labor law now have the opportunity to undermine the bargaining relationship between MLB
players and the league. Before the Curt Flood Act of 1998, the courts could only cite Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, no matter how they disagreed with its holding. Now, players and
MLB have to be aware of the courts' attitude toward antitrust and labor law issues. The courts'
views on how antitrust law should be applied to professional baseball and its views on labor
law influenced Congress to enact the Curt Flood Act of 1998.
139 Flood, 407 U.S. at 284.
140 Highlights from the Rise ofAmerican Labor Unions, supra note 61.
141 Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
142 See Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
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2. Congress's Involvement-The Making of the Curt Flood Act of 1998
When signing the Curt Flood Act of 1998 into law, President Bill Clintonl 43 remarked,
"It is sound policy to treat the employment matters of Major League Baseball players under the
antitrust laws in the same way such matters are treated for athletes in other professional
sports."144  So why did Congress wait seventy-six years after Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore and twenty-six years after being told what to do by the Court in Flood to enact the
Curt Flood Act? As noted by President Clinton, "policy" dictated the result.14 5 The "policy"
was the change in the political atmosphere surrounding Congress, and it eventually forced
Congress to respond to professional baseball's antitrust immunity.
The Supreme Court left the door open for the political process to work and for Congress
to be the one to remove baseball's antitrust immunity. In Flood, the Court cited the need for
Congress to overrule the common law that had developed surrounding the world of baseball.14 6
The Court did not want to overrule itself so it felt that it was Congress's job to rework the
statutory language, which would impact both federal antitrust and federal labor law. In 1998,
Congress finally stepped up and exercised its role as the law-making branch of the federal
government.
The political process only began to work after the 1994-95 strike by MLB players. The
strike prompted Congress to act. 147  Legislative history shows several attempts to adjust
143 William J. Clinton was the forty-second President of the United States. William J Clinton, WhiteHouse.com,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/bc42.html (last visited May 5, 2004).
144 Statement by President of the United States, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 637 (1998).
145 Id.
146 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 277 (1972).
147 Curt Flood Act of 1997, S. 118, 105th Cong. § 1 (1997).
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baseball's antitrust immunity.148 In a 1997 Senate Report, the purpose of the Curt Flood Act
was explored:
As set forth . . . the "Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995," a
bill that was reported out of the Judiciary Committee but not enacted during the
104th Congress, the unfortunate baseball strike of 1994-95 reemphasized the
need for Congress to clarify its intent to apply to professional baseball the same
rules of fair and open competition that are followed by all other unregulated
business enterprises in this country, including other sports leagues. In short,
other professional athletes and similarly situated employees have alternatives to
striking specifically because of the antitrust laws. It is the Committee's belief
that the applicability of the antitrust laws to major league baseball player-owner
employment relations will significantly reduce the likelihood of future baseball
strikes.149 (footnote omitted)
This history shows that the 1994-95 strike changed the political view of baseball and its labor
market. Congress was under pressure to place professional baseball at the same level as other
professional sport leagues.
Congress's role in government is to make the laws and to represent the public.
Members of Congress sought to represent what they perceived to be the sentiment of outraged
fans and to gain political support among their constituents. 1o Along with being a source of
political pressure upon the bargaining relationship between players and management, the 1994-
95 strike changed the general public's view of professional baseball.
3. The Public's View of Baseball-The Labor Turmoil in MLB
Known as "the national pastime," baseball is watched and played by many Americans.
But even before the 1994-95 strike, the general public view of professional baseball had begun
148 See Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995, S. 231, 104th Cong. (1996).
149 S. 118.
1 See Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995, 141 Cong. Rec. S. 4545, 104th Cong. (1995)
(statement of Dem. Leahy, Senator); Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995, 141 Cong. Rec. S.
4660, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Rep. Hatch, Senator).
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to slowly change. As the number of years increased from when Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore has been decided, so had the number of other professional sport leagues."' This
trend away from professional baseball as the most popular sport in America is reflected in the
television broadcasting contracts that other professional sport leagues were able to make. By
1970, the NFL was already receiving more money for the television rights to its games.152
MLB was paid eighteen million dollars by the television networks for their games. 15 The NFL
received fifty million dollars.1 54  By 1985, the monetary figures rose to $160 million for
baseball and $450 million for football.15 5  Along with dealing with competition from other
professional sport leagues, the 1994-95 strike created a wider rift between professional baseball
and the general viewing public. Professional baseball had to compete with itself to maintain a
positive public view.' 56
Between 1972 and the 1994-95 strike, MLB experienced eight separate work
stoppages. In August of 1994, MLB faced a big labor dispute. The general public's view of
baseball was tarnished because the strike as when the regular season was about to end.'5 8 As a
151 Compared to the other professional leagues, Major League Baseball, which began play in 1876, was old at the
time of Federal Baseball Club ofBaltimore. The National Football League came into existence in 1922, the
National Hockey League was established in 1917, and the National Basketball Association was started in 1946.
National Football League, NFL History, available at http://www.nfl.com/history/chronology/1921-1930 (last
visited May 1, 2004); National Hockey League, History, available at
http://nhl.com/hockeyu/history/evolution.html (last visited May 1, 2004); National Basketball Association, NBA
Timeline, available at http://www.nba.com/history (last May 1, 2004).
152 THE MUSEUM OF BROADCAST COMMUNICATIONS, Sports and Television, at
http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/S/htmlS/sportsandte/sportsandte.htm (last visited May 1, 2004).
153 id.
154id.
155 id.
156 Paul D. Staudohar, U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Baseball Strike of 1994-95, at
http://stats.bls.gov/opub/mlr/ 1997/03/art4full.pdf (last visited May 2, 2004).157 id
15 World Series History: Recaps and Results, WORLDSERIES.COM, available at
http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/history/postseason/mlb ws.jsp?feature-recapsindex (last visited March
30, 2004).
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result of the strike, the playoffs and the World Series, the championship games for MLB, were
not held for the first time since 1904.159 The strike lasted 232 days, and was ended not by the
players or management, but because the National Labor Relations Board found an unfair labor
practice by the league.' 60
Many fans viewed the strike as a dispute between multimillion-dollar athletes and a
multibillion-dollar league, and between management and players who enjoyed the game and
wished for the game to be played.16 1 The 1994-95 strike alienated many long-standing, loyal
fans, and some argue that baseball has never fully recovered from the strike.162 When MLB
continued its operation in 1995, the fans showed their displeasure with the league and its
players by not attending the games.163 During the shortened 1995 season, attendance dropped
by twenty percent from the year before.' 64 On average, over six thousand fewer fans attended
every professional baseball game played in 1995.165 In the ten years since the baseball strike,
MLB has yet to achieve a higher average attendance figure per game than before the strike.166
The 1994-95 strike also affected television viewership. Since the 1995 season, the television
ratings for the World Series have also dropped. 167 In only one year later, the 1995 World
159
16o Staudohar, supra note 156. The NLRB enjoined the league from unilaterally imposing a salary cap on the
players because impasse had not been reached, and reinstated terms of the old collective bargaining agreement. Id.
The court system upheld the injunction, and the players called off the strike after their victory in court. Id
161 Id.
162id.
163 id.
164 Id. The 1995 season consisted of 144 regular season games. Id.
165MLB Attendance, at http://kenn.com/sports/baseball/mlb/ml numbers.html (last visited May 2, 2004).
166 Id. Attendance in 1994 averaged 31,256 spectators per game. Id. The 2001 season had the highest average
attendance since the strike with 29,378 spectators. Id.
167 Baseball Almanac, World Series: Television Analysis and Ratings Breakdown, at http://www.baseball-
almanac.com/ws/wstv.shtml (last visited May 2, 2004).
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Series was ironically able to produce better television ratings than the 1993 World Series.168
The public's reaction to the 1994-95 strike is a classic example of how much the
public's view of professional sport greatly affects the bargaining relationship between players
and the league. Neither the players nor a league can afford to anger the public, who is the main
support of sport leagues.169 Economically, just like all other professional sport leagues,
professional baseball cannot survive without its fans, and both sides of the bargaining table are
aware of this important fact.170
A prime example of how the public's view of baseball affects the bargaining
relationship since the 1994-95 strike and the subsequent enactment of the Curt Flood Act of
1998 occurred recently in 2002. Professional baseball found itself again in a labor dispute.' 71
This time, however, the outcome was different. Both sides knew they could not upset society's
view of baseball by having yet another strike or lockout. As one newspaper stated, "[The
public is] bewildered that, at a time when people are out of work, when a nation is at war
fighting terrorism, baseball can't find a way out of its self-imposed problems."' 72 The league
even went as far as scheduling online "Town Meetings" with the commissioner to help placate
fans during the labor negotiations.173 There was justifiable speculation about whether MLB
could have survived if a labor dispute had indeed occurred instead of the players and
16 Id.
169 For some views about work stoppages of other professional sport leagues see Damon Hack, In the N.F.L., It's
Not About Money, But It Is, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2004, §8, at 9; Shannon Fromma, Hockey's Fans Roll with Hits,
TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Oct. 8, 2004, at Cl.
170 The absence of fans not only affects a league and its teams, but other businesses depending upon the existence
of a league. See, e.g., Thomas J. Ryan, NHL Fan Gear on Ice, SPORTING GOODS BUSINESS, Nov. 1, 2004.
17' Ronald Blum, Baseball Labor Dispute Q & A, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 13, 2002, at
http://www.kansas.com/mld/kansas/sports/baseball/3857204.htm (last visited May 2, 2004).
172 Don Walker, Fans Appear Upset with Both Sides in Labor Dispute, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Aug. 20,
2002, at http://www.dfw.com/mld/belleville/sports/baseball/3904723.htm?1c (last visited May 2, 2004).
173 Baseball Commish to Go Online to Discuss Labor Dispute, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 8, 2002, at
http://www.newschannel8.com/Global/story.asp?S=847734 (last visited May 2, 2004).
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management working out their differences.174 Overall, the public's view creates the socio-
economic pressure MLB faces when there is a labor dispute.
4. The Overall Effect on the Bargaining Relationship
The Court's view, Congress's enactment of the Curt Flood Act, and the public's view
all affect the bargaining relationship between the players and management in professional
baseball. Both the players and the league know that baseball will enjoy no more favoritism in
the court system. Unilateral acts by management and rules outside of the collective bargaining
agreement can be subject to federal antitrust scrutiny. The bargaining process itself became an
important aspect for the league, and the political and socio-economic climates provide a need to
stay out of the court system and to avoid strikes and lockouts. For the league, the provisions in
the collective bargaining agreement became the most important "weapons" it had to defend
itself from antitrust claims.
Most importantly, pressure placed on both players and the league to enjoy labor
harmony comes mostly from the fans themselves. Baseball's numerous labor disputes have
negatively affected its reputation. By passing the Curt Flood Act of 1998, Congress sent a
political message to MLB, on behalf of the general public, not to strike again. The Curt Flood
Act did open up another avenue for disputes to be resolved, but that avenue is arguably
ineffective. 7 5  The Curt Flood Act also placed socio-economic pressure on the league to
comply with the law or be subject to the treble damages awarded for antitrust violations.' 7 6
Perhaps, both players and management are willing to settle labor disputes without picket lines
174 See, e.g., Harris Interactive, Can Baseball Retain Its Fans Amid the Labor Dispute?, July 9, 2002, at
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=472 (last visited May 2, 2004).
1 Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c, 26 (2004).
176 Id.
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because both sides know that MLB will struggle to survive another work stoppage so soon after
the 1994-95 strike and the Curt Flood Act of 1998.
Legislative history from 1997 reveals that Congress received political pressure from an
unexpected source.177 The league must have known that the end was near for its complete
antitrust immunity, and sought to soften the impact on the bargaining relationship. Following
the 1994-95 strike, the MLB players and the league agreed to seek Congress's help to adjust
professional baseball's antitrust immunity. 78 The collective bargaining agreement signed by
players and management in March of 1997, the parties agree to
jointly request and cooperate in lobbying the Congress to pass a law that will
clarify that Major League Baseball players are covered under the antitrust laws
(i.e. that Major League Players have the same rights under the antitrust laws as
do other professional athletes, e.g. football and basketball players), along with a
provision that makes it clear that passage of that bill does not change the
application of the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect to any other
person or entity.179
This unique agreement between players and management foreshadowed the end of professional
baseball's unlimited antitrust immunity.
The league wanted to ease the pressure that Congress was under after the 1994-95
strike. It also wanted to ease impact the society's view of labor disputes had on the economics
of professional baseball. The existence of such a provision in the collective bargaining
agreement shows that the bargaining relationship was changed by the 1994-1995 strike and the
subsequent Curt Flood Act of 1998. For the first time, the players were able to bargain
successfully over an issue that had limited their strength at the bargaining table since 1922.
Curt Flood Act of 1997, S. 118, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
178 Id.
17 Id.
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Thanks to the prevailing political and socio-economic climates, the Curt Flood Act fulfilled the
players' wishes for their labor market to be treated like the other professional sports labor
markets.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professional baseball has seen many changes since the Supreme Court's decision to
grant them federal antitrust immunity in 1922. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore placed
MLB on a pedestal, but in 1998 their status was changed when Congress enacted the Curt
Flood Act. 80 Their new status changed the dynamics of the bargaining relationship in Major
League Baseball between players and management. After the Curt Flood Act of 1998,
management can no longer rely on immunity from federal antitrust law when unilaterally
placing restrictions on the labor market. However, the bargaining relationship between players
and management was not as affected as it could have been by the Curt Flood Act because of the
nonstatutory labor exemption for terms set forth in collective bargaining agreements. The
bargaining relationship was impacted more by the socio-economic climates, political climates,
and ethical considerations surrounding the Curt Flood Act.
The Curt Flood Act was a culmination point in political and socio-economic climates
that demanded something be done about professional baseball's recurring labor disputes, and
the true test of the bargaining relationship between players and the league will come in 2006.181
180 See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat'l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b
(2004).
181 For a copy of the current collective bargaining agreement see Basic Agreement, at
http://us.il.yimg.com/us.yimg.com/i/spo/mlbpa/mlbpa cba.pdf (last visited May 3, 2004).
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On December 19, 2006 the current collective bargaining agreement will expire.182 At the very
least, the players and management agreed to delay labor tensions until after the 2006 season is
completed; therefore, not having the potential to interrupt play in the middle of the season like
the strike in 1994-95. By the time the agreement expires, MLB will be over ten years removed
from the last strike. The Curt Flood Act of 1998 will still be there to govern the bargaining
relationship, but it will be the socio-economic and political considerations that will affect the
outcome at the bargaining table. The players and the league will have to weigh whether a tenth
strike or lockout in thirty-four years would be extremely harmful to the game.
182 Four-Year Deal Includes Luxury Tax, No Contraction, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 30, 2002, at
http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/2002/0830/1425253.html (last visited May 3, 2004).
183 The 1994-95 strike was the ninth labor dispute since 1972.
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